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Fees for Claim Settlement in the Field of Personal Injury:
Empirical Evidence from the Netherlands
by
Michael G Faure and Niels J Philipsen*
Abstract: Based on data supplied by five Dutch insurers for the years 2001– 2006, the authors
analyse the development of hourly fees charged by attorneys and other legal representatives
(claims agents) in personal injury cases. The analysis focuses on cases that did not go to court
but where, according to Dutch law, a fee shifting rule applies: that is, the (insurer of the) losing
party must pay the costs of the winner’s legal assistance. One may expect that such a fee
shifting rule would to some extent restrict competition in the market. The data indeed appear
to suggest that in the Netherlands fees of personal injury lawyers have increased rather
dramatically in recent years: more than double price and wage inflation, and much more than
the fees of, for example, a trustee in bankruptcy. We offer some explanations for this based on
the well-known law and economics literature. Although the fee increase we found may
indeed be related to the Dutch fee shifting rule, the data we collected (which all relate to
recent years) did not allow us to make a sufficiently robust connection between the two. They
do, however, provide a rare and valuable insight into modern personal injuries practice in the
Netherlands.
(2010) 1 JETL 75
I. Introduction
In this paper we report on research executed for the Dutch Insurers’ Institute on
Personal Injury. The insurers wanted an investigation into the fees paid in the
event of claim settlement in personal injury cases because they had the im-
pression that lawyers’ fees and more particularly the hourly rates charged have
increased substantially since 2000.
The legal background for this is the following. According to Article 6:96 of the
Dutch Civil Code, patrimonial damage includes the reasonable costs of claiming
compensation out of court. This part of the damages is referred to as extraju-
dicial costs (buitengerechtelijke kosten). On the basis of Article 6:96, an injurer
can thus be held liable to compensate for legal fees incurred out of court by the
victim.1 In the Netherlands, as in some other European legal systems, the victim
of a tort can therefore claim compensation for extrajudicial legal fees from the
* We are grateful to the participants in the 2008 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies
(Cornell, 12 –13 September 2008), to an anonymous reviewer prior to this conference,
and to our discussant Herbert M Kritzer for useful comments afterwards. We are also
grateful to two anonymous reviewers for JETL.
1 See M Faure/T Hartlief, The Netherlands, in: H Koziol/BC Steininger (eds), European













































injurer’s liability insurer.2 This possibility was introduced in a decision by the
Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) of 3 April 1987.3 However, after a new Civil Code
was introduced in the Netherlands in 1992, the obligation of the (insurer of) the
injurer to pay for such extrajudicial costs has also been laid down in Article 6:96
of the Civil Code. Compensation for these costs is subject to a so-called ‘double
reasonableness test’: first, it should be reasonable that the victim in the particular
circumstances called on expert help; second, the legal fees themselves have to be
reasonable in amount. In practice, problems often arise concerning the question
what ‘reasonable’ legal fees are, which results in many discussions between the
injurer’s liability insurer and lawyers representing the victim.
The goal of our research was to examine whether the fees paid to lawyers as part
of the extrajudicial costs have indeed increased since 2000 and, if that is the case,
whether it would be possible to examine whether this increase is higher than
price increases in general or in similar (or at least comparable) legal services.
Moreover, it was also obviously a goal of the research to try to provide possible
explanations for the empirical evidence found.
Our research methodology is both theoretical and empirical. First, we examine
on the basis of the law and economics literature what the expected effect would
be of such a ‘fee shifting rule’. Basic economic insight teaches us that, when
lawyers are able to shift their fees to liability insurers, their incentives for re-
ducing those fees will be low, given that in the relationship between the lawyer
and the injurer’s liability insurer competitive pressures do not force the lawyer
to reduce his fees. It is this theoretical starting point (which will be explained in
Section II) that will be tested on the basis of a detailed analysis of approximately
one thousand files that have been provided to us by five liability insurers in the
Netherlands. The goal is to provide an impression of the development of ex-
trajudicial costs paid during the period 2001–2006.
This data analysis is supplemented by qualitative research concerning the de-
velopment of extrajudicial costs. More particularly, in order to determine po-
tential causes, we held interviews with chairmen of representative associations of
personal injury lawyers in the Netherlands (consisting of attorneys only).4 We
also held an interview with Raoul van Dort, a lawyer who represents interests of
victims of personal injury, but who is not an attorney. We refer in this paper to
2 In addition, there is also a possibility to obtain compensation for so-called process costs in
the case of a legal procedure on the basis of Arts 237 –240 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The general rule is, however, that it is the losing party who pays the costs.
3 Hoge Raad, 3 April 1987, London and Lancashire v Drenth.
4 One interview was held with Peter Langstraat, chairman of the Association of Personal
Injury Lawyers (Vereniging van Letselschadeadvocaten – LSA); a second interview was
held with John Beer, chairman of the Association of Attorneys of Personal Injury Victims
(Vereniging van Advocaten voor Slachtoffers van Personenschade – ASP). The difference
between these associations is that the members of the LSA include all types of personal
injury lawyers, whereas the ASP consists of claimant attorneys alone.













































this second category (legal assistance providers, not being attorneys) as ‘claims
agents’.5
After a presentation of our analysis of case files in Section III, Section IV con-
siders the development of fees for different and comparable services. Section V
provides a comparison and analysis of the research results.
II. Theoretical starting points
The first question that arises is whether, on the basis of the traditional law and
economics literature, any prediction can be made about the effects of fee shif-
ting, ie the fact that the victim’s lawyer will have his fees paid by the injurer’s
insurer. Next, we address the market for legal assistance in personal injury cases
and then discuss the relationship between the lawyer and the liability insurer as
far as extrajudicial costs are concerned.
A. Fee shifting in the law and economics literature
Economists have paid much attention to the effects of a shifting of legal fees to
the loser at trial. In the literature, this is often referred to as the ‘English rule’,
although in practice the differences between the ‘American rule’ (each party
bears his own costs) and the ‘English rule’ (the loser pays everything) may be
smaller than is generally presumed.6 Shavell shows that fee shifting has conse-
quences for the incentives to sue: it leads to more suits when plaintiffs have
higher probabilities of winning and to fewer suits in the reverse situation of
lower probabilities of winning. And, when a suit is brought, fee shifting also has
an underlying tendency to increase the likelihood of trial. Furthermore, Shavell
argues that an effect of fee shifting is that parties will generally spend more on
legal fees. The reasons are: first, that a party will not necessarily have to pay the
bill of his own attorney and, second, that fee shifting increases the payoff from
winning since in that case reasonably incurred legal fees can be recovered from
the other side.7 Cooter and Ulen support Shavell’s conclusions, adding that in
those disputes where liability is conceded by the defendant and the parties only
5 For reasons of simplicity we refer to all parties providing legal assistance to victims during
the claim settlement process as ‘personal injury lawyers’. However, since claims agents
are not regulated, they do not necessarily have to be lawyers. Some of them certainly are,
but it is not required. Attorneys on the other hand are always lawyers and in addition have
to be a member of the Bar and are thus subject to legal ethics and regulation.
6 See AW Katz, Indemnity of legal fees, in: B Bouckaert/G de Geest, Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics, Vol V: The economics of crime and litigation (2000) 63– 94.
7 S Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (2004) 428 –432. However, Shavell
does not examine the relationship between the phenomenon of fee shifting and the hourly
rates charged by lawyers.













































contest the quantum of damages, the English rule discourages trials by penali-
sing hard bargaining, even though it may increase the number of cases due to
‘false optimism’.8
In the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Katz discusses the (scarce) empi-
rical literature on the effects of fee shifting.9 The only relevant research where the
effects of fee shifting have been empirically tested is by Snyder and Hughes10
who report on a policy experiment in Florida between 1980 and 1985 using the
English rule in medical malpractice cases. They found that, as a result of fee
shifting, a significantly higher percentage of claims were withdrawn at an early
stage of the litigation. This seems to correspond with the theoretical prediction
that fee shifting discourages risk-averse plaintiffs with low chances of winning.
They also found that defendants spent significantly more on each case and that,
ceteris paribus, the likelihood that a case comes to court increases under fee
shifting. Finally, Snyder and Hughes concluded that fee shifting benefits
plaintiffs with high-quality or high-damage claims at the expense of those with
low-quality or low-damage claims, and possibly at the expense of defendants.
This general law and economics literature provides a few interesting insights but
does not deal with the more specific question we are looking into. In our specific
(Dutch) case, there is no uncertainty as far as liability is concerned since, in the
majority of cases, the liability of the injurer is admitted and it is also admitted
that the defendant is obliged to compensate the total costs of the victim (in-
cluding legal fees). Negotiations usually take place only with regard to the
amount of the damages. The models we discussed above generally involve much
more uncertainty since it is not known whether the case will be lost or won or
what type of decision will ensue as far as legal fees are concerned. Therefore, in
the remainder of this Section, we will take a different theoretical approach in
order to analyse the possible effects of this shifting of extrajudicial costs to the
insurer of the injurer. We first describe briefly the general market for legal
assistance in personal injury cases and then focus on the particular characteristics
of the relationship between the victim’s lawyer and the injurer’s insurer.
8 R Cooter/RT Ulen, Law and Economics (4th edn 2004) 425 – 427. For a modelling of this
English rule, see also CE Hyde/PL Williams, Necessary Costs and Expenditure In-
centives under the English Rule (2002) 22 International Review of Law and Economics
133.
9 Katz (fn 6) 83 – 88.
10 EA Snyder/JW Hughes, The English rule of allocating costs: Evidence confronts theory
(1990) 6 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 345; JW Hughes/EA Snyder,
Litigation and settlement under the English and American rules: Theory and evidence
(1995) 38 Journal of Law and Economics 225.













































B. Market for legal assistance in personal injury cases
The starting point for analysing the relationship between the victim and the
lawyer in personal injury cases is information asymmetry: the lawyer is well
informed of the nature and quality of the services he provides, whereas the
victim usually does not have this type of information.11 In personal injury cases,
victims are moreover usually ‘one shotters’ rather than ‘repeat players’, so there
is no learning effect. In the traditional law and economics literature, information
asymmetry is considered a form of market failure, and therefore some kind of
intervention in the market may be justified, for example, in the form of (self-)
regulation.12 However, economic scholarship has also criticised the (self-)re-
gulation of the (legal) profession since there is always the danger that this may
lead to a restriction of competition.13
For the potential victim of personal injury in the Netherlands there are three
options for obtaining legal assistance. The first option is to use an attorney-at-
law. In the Netherlands a specialisation has taken place as a result of which
attorneys specialised in personal injury cases have gathered together in two
associations.14 Membership of these associations is subject to quality control.
For example, to become a member of the Association of Personal Injury
Lawyers (Vereniging van Letselschadeadvocaten – LSA), an attorney has to
follow an intensive series of courses.
Second, legal assistance can also be provided by persons other than attorneys.
The reason is that more than 95 % of personal injury cases in the Netherlands
are settled out of court. The attorney’s monopoly over advocacy in court hence
does not prevent persons other than attorneys from representing the interests of
personal injury victims. As aforementioned, we refer to such representatives as
‘claims agents’ in order to distinguish them from attorneys.15
A third possibility is that legal assistance can be provided through legal expenses
insurance. In approximately 30 % of all personal injury cases in the Netherlands
a legal expenses insurer is involved. In such cases, legal expenses insurers
themselves provide legal assistance through lawyers (or other professionals)
working for them and assisting the victim. The latter constitute a separate group
which has not been further considered in our research.
11 For more details see NJ Philipsen, Regulation of and by Pharmacists in the Netherlands
and Belgium: An Economic Approach (2003) 14– 17. See also PH Rubin, Information
Regulation, in: B Bouckaert/G de Geest, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol III:
The regulation of contracts (2000) 271 –295.
12 AI Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Theory (1994); Philipsen (fn 11) 9 –45.
13 See further on this issue CD Ehlermann/I Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law
Annual 2004: The Relationship Between Competition Law and the (Liberal) Professi-
ons (2006).
14 The LSA and ASP. See fn 4.
15 See also fn 5.













































There is hence, in principle, a large number of professionals active on the market
for legal assistance in personal injury cases. Ex ante a (potential) victim has a
large choice of available options. Whether the market is completely transparent
and whether victims are fully informed of the quality of services provided is a
separate issue which is not the focus of our research.16
As far as the victim’s choice between an attorney or other legal representative is
concerned, an important difference is that attorneys are subject to regulation and
self-regulation whereas this is not the case for other professionals. Regulation of
attorneys inter alia restricts the possibility of attracting clients via advertising,
but more importantly also restricts the possibility of applying a result-based fee
system.17 In the Netherlands ‘no win no fee’ arrangements are prohibited;18 for
other providers of legal assistance, these limitations do not exist. Attorneys have
therefore argued that they are at a competitive disadvantage because they are not
allowed to offer ‘no win no fee’ arrangements to victims.19 As a result of this
disparity, the Dutch Competition Authority, the Nederlandse Mededingings-
autoriteit – NMa, held that the regulation prohibiting ‘no win no fee’ violates
competition law.20
An important element of the market structure is that, given the fact that the legal
fees will be reimbursed by the injurer as extrajudicial costs, the victim seeking
legal assistance should not necessarily worry about the price he pays for his legal
assistance. Only when there is uncertainty concerning the question of liability is
there a risk that the victim will have to bear the legal costs himself. The websites
of law firms specialised in personal injury on the one hand, show the appropriate
hourly rate in personal injury cases but they also indicate that in many cases
these costs can be recovered from the liable party’s insurer.21
The relatively small risk run by the victim relates to situations where liability is
denied by the liable party or where no agreement on the amount of damages can
16 More particularly as far as claims agents are concerned, there is sometimes doubt as to
whether they provide accurate information to victims and whether victims are always
able to assess the quality of the services provided.
17 For details, see MG Faure/FJ Fernhout/NJ Philipsen, Resultaatgerelateerde belonings-
systemen voor advocaten (2009).
18 Even though at the beginning of 2008 the Minister of Justice allowed a (limited) expe-
riment with result-based fees.
19 Interview with LSA chairman, Peter Langstraat on 10 September 2007.
20 NMa, Case 560/87 (Engelgeer-NOVA), 21 February 2002.
21 See, for example, the website of Moree Gelderblom Attorneys (the law firm of LSA
chairman, Peter Langstraat): ‘The hourly fee in personal injury cases is E 215 – 265.
However, in many cases it will cost you nothing, since in the large majority of the cases
in which the adverse party is liable, the extra procedural costs (being the costs which are
made until the case comes before the judge. In many cases, we never will have to go to
court since the case is settled) will be completely paid by the liable party or his insurer.
The procedure therefore in those cases costs absolutely nothing to the victim’ <http://
www.mglaw.nl/tarieven/htm>.













































be reached through negotiation and a court case is therefore necessary. In such
cases, there is still a risk that (a part of) the legal fees will have to be borne by the
victim himself, particularly in the case where he loses at trial. However, in those
cases (in fact, the large majority) where liability is undisputed, the injurer’s
insurer has to compensate the extrajudicial costs (legal fees). As a result, the price
to be paid should not be a decisive factor ex ante for the victim. There is still, as
we have indicated, a difference in the choice between an attorney or another
provider of legal services: a risk-averse victim could (particularly in the situation
where liability is not admitted) choose to limit his risks by making a ‘no win no
fee’ arrangement with a claims agent.
C. Relationship between the lawyer and the injurer’s insurer
The choice of lawyer is obviously made by the victim; the insurer of the liable
party (who afterwards has to pay the lawyer’s legal fees as extrajudicial costs) has
no influence on this decision. Apart from the ‘double reasonableness test’ we
referred to above, there are few reasons for the lawyer to limit his legal fees. Even
though personal injury lawyers are usually ‘repeat players’ and may deal re-
gularly with similar insurers, this will not provide them with any incentive to
reduce their fees for the simple reason that it is not the insurer of the injurer who
chooses the lawyer in the next case.
It can therefore be expected that the lawyer, within this system where his fees
can be billed to the insurer as extrajudicial costs, will have little incentive to
reduce them. Notwithstanding this theoretical starting point, the interviewees in
our study maintained that their billing behaviour22 is not influenced by the fact
that their fees can be billed to the insurer. They therefore argued that there is in
principle no incentive to inflate their fees.
The relationship between the lawyer and the insurer may thus be qualified as a
quasi-monopoly or ‘situational monopoly’ in the sense that, in this particular
situation, the insurer has no influence on the lawyer who is chosen by the victim
and can hence (as a monopolist) charge monopoly prices for the fees provided.
Of course, the insurer will try to pass on the legal fees charged by the lawyer via
its insurance premiums. The shifting of the victim’s legal fees (and the potential
for consequent overbilling) may lead to a loss of efficiency (because of ineffi-
ciently high claim settlement costs in personal injury cases) and to a redistri-
bution of costs to the general group of insureds.
The position of the insurer in this particular situation is comparable to that of
insurers covering health costs under certain social insurance schemes. In that
situation too, patients can (within regulatory limits) freely choose the provider
of their health care services and bill the cost to their insurer or a social security
22 Both as far as the hourly rate and as far as the hours charged are concerned.













































agency. In health economics it has been argued that this system provides few
incentives to cost reduction to the provider of health care services.23 The policy
response to the fear of the increasing social costs of health care has usually been
regulation of the tariffs applying to health care services.
The question of course arises whether in the system of claims handling in per-
sonal injury cases in the Netherlands the shifting of legal fees to the injurer’s
insurer will (in the absence of regulation on tariffs) lead to a similar social loss
resulting from increased administrative costs. It was that particular question
which constituted the starting point of our empirical analysis.
III. Empirical study
A. Database
1) The selection of the files
In the framework of our research for the Dutch Insurers’ Institute on Personal
Injury, we were provided with many personal injury cases by five liability
insurers who are active in the personal injury market in the Netherlands.24 The
starting point was to select 240 files from every insurer, ie 40 files for each year in
the period 2001–2006. This gave us a representative selection of 200 files for
every year. In the Netherlands on a yearly basis there are approximately 50,000
personal injury cases; in approximately half of these cases (25,000) a lawyer is
active. Given the fact that we aimed at a reliability level of 95 % and an error
margin of 10 % (on the basis of current statistically accepted standards), this
meant we needed at least 96 files for every year.25
The files were selected by the insurance company on the basis of a random
sample, meaning that every file had exactly the same probability of being se-
lected. In order to obtain this result, we asked insurers to provide us with a list
containing case numbers for each of the years 2001–2006. We subsequently
executed the selection randomly.
2) Description of the total database
Our database consists of 1,043 files covering the period 2001–2006. In a small
number of files several lawyers were active, each using different tariffs. In ad-
23 See generally CE Phelps, Health economics (2009) ch 10. See also, DM Cutler/RJ
Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in: AJ Culyer/JP Newhouse (eds),
Handbook of Health Economics (2000) 563 –643.
24 Aegon, Delta Lloyd, Fortis ASR, Univé and ZLM Verzekeringen.
25 See, for example, BL Bowerman/RT O’Connell, Business statistics in practice (2007).













































dition there were a few files which only provided information on the total
amount of extrajudicial costs, without mentioning the hourly rate charged.
Therefore the database of 1,043 files provided a total of 1,063 observations
concerning hourly rates. Of these 1,063 observations (representing 1,063 in-
terventions by a lawyer), 489 concerned an attorney-at-law and 574 cases
concerned other legal representatives (claims agents). The database equally
provides information concerning the type of cases concerned. The large majo-
rity of the 1,043 files concerned traffic accidents, but there were a few cases
dealing with accidents at work, general liability and corporate liability. The
1,043 cases can be classified as follows:
Table 1 Type of cases








In order to estimate the complexity of cases, the database also provides some
information on the question whether there was discussion concerning the
liability of the injurer and the number of expert reports. Regarding the que-
stion whether liability was disputed, the response was (in as far as this question
was answered) ‘yes’ 119 times and ‘no’ 905 times. As far as the number of
expert reports which were used are concerned, the following observations
were made in the 1,043 cases:26
Table 2 Number of expert reports











26 Our database also provides information concerning the starting point and date of (al-
most all) files. We, however, have eliminated this information here, since it is less
relevant for our current analysis.














































We will first analyse the development of the average hourly rate which was
billed to the insurers without considering the number of hours charged.
1) Hourly rates in the total database
Table 3 below provides the average hourly rates for each of the years 2001 –
2006 as they appeared from our database. The number of observations changes
for every year.27 The reasons are that (a) information on the hourly rates
charged was not given in every file, (b) there are files where more than one
lawyer was active and (c) most files run over several years, which increases the
probability of having more observations in more recent years.
Table 3 Average hourly rates (entire database)
Year Number of observations Average
hourly rate
Increase compared to the
previous year
Increase (2001=100)
2001 85 E 149.39 100.00
2002 217 E 159.21 6.57 % 106.57
2003 363 E 165.35 3.86 % 110.68
2004 491 E 172.60 4.38 % 115.54
2005 555 E 180.21 4.41 % 120.63
2006 568 E 185.90 3.16 % 124.44
As Table 3 shows, on average, the hourly rates increased in the period 2001 –
2006. The highest increase took place in 2002, the year after the Euro was
introduced. The last column in Table 3 shows the cumulative increase. This
hence shows that, in the entire period, the average hourly rate billed to insurers
increased by 24.44 %.
2) A comparison between attorneys and claims agents
The average hourly rates charged by attorneys are, as Table 4 shows, higher
than the values found for the entire database (attorneys and claims agents
together). On average the hourly rate of an attorney is approximately E 20
higher than the hourly rate of a claims agent (see Table 5). However, the
differences seem to become smaller over time. Claims agents’ fees have inc-
reased more rapidly in relative terms. When comparing the average hourly
27 In order to eliminate the problem of having separate samples for each year, we also
conducted an analysis where we calculated only price increases within specific cases (ie
for the same personal injury lawyer). The results are quite similar to the ones presented
in Table 1, although the number of observations is obviously lower.













































rates in the period 2001 –2006 one notices an average increase of 21.76 % in the
amounts charged by attorneys, whereas the corresponding increase is 28.77 %
for claims agents.
3) Analysis based on the median
In this Section we present the results of the calculation of the median for
attorneys, claims agents and the entire database. Table 6 shows that the median
in the period 2001 –2006 increased by 22.78 % for attorneys and by exactly
25 % for claims agents. When attorneys and claims agents are taken together,
the median in the period appears to have increased by a little more than 20 %.
These numbers correspond with the numbers provided earlier on the basis of
the averages.
Table 4 Average hourly rates (attorneys)
Year Number of observations Average
hourly rate
Increase compared to the
previous year
Increase (2001=100)
2001 42 E 160.11 100.00
2002 114 E 168.35 5.14 % 105.15
2003 187 E 176.48 4.83 % 110.22
2004 255 E 181.70 2.96 % 113.48
2005 267 E 189.58 4.34 % 118.41
2006 248 E 194.95 2.83 % 121.76
Table 5 Average hourly rates (claims agents)
Year Number of observations Average
hourly rate
Increase compared to the
previous year
Increase (2001=100)
2001 43 E 138.91 100.00
2002 103 E 149.10 7.33 % 107.34
2003 176 E 153.52 2.96 % 110.51
2004 236 E 162.76 6.02 % 117.17
2005 288 E 171.52 5.38 % 123.48
2006 320 E 178.88 4.29 % 128.77
Table 6 Median hourly rates
Year Attorneys Claims agents Entire database
2001 E 158.82 E 140.00 E 149.74
2002 E 166.50 E 150.00 E 154.00
2003 E 175.00 E 152.00 E 162.00
2004 E 185.00 E 160.00 E 170.00
2005 E 193.00 E 170.00 E 175.00
2006 E 195.00 E 175.00 E 180.00













































4. Claims agents: further analysis of the cases
In the analysis presented so far, we of course used all observations provided to
us by the insurers. A large majority of lawyers appear more than once in the
database and some firms also appear quite frequently. Statistically this does not
cause any problems for the reason that the database provides randomly se-
lected cases and therefore provides a correct image of the probability that an
insurer will be confronted with a particular firm. However, we also examined
whether there is a particular influence on hourly rates of relatively large (in the
sense of frequently used) firms compared to smaller (in the sense of less fre-
quently used) firms. We performed this exercise for the claims agents by
excluding the 10 largest (in the sense of most frequently used) claims bureaus.
The results are as follows:
A comparison of these numbers with the numbers presented in Tables 5 and 6
above shows that the averages and medians are systematically lower when the
most frequently encountered firms are excluded from the selection. An ob-
vious conclusion therefore is that a few of these larger firms use tariffs which
are higher than average. However, the numbers also show that the relative
increase of hourly rates with these (relatively) smaller firms is structurally
higher than for the entire database. In the entire period 2001 –2006, the average
hourly rate increased by 31.65 % (compared to 28.77 % in Table 5) and the
median increased by 31.64 % (compared to 25 % in Table 6). It seems that
there is a ‘catching up’ effect as a result of which the smaller firms have adjusted
their tariffs closer to the tariffs charged by the larger players.
C. Relationship between extrajudicial costs and damages
We also examined the relationship between the total amount of extrajudicial
costs paid by the insurer and the damages awarded (compensation received by
the victim). The total extrajudicial costs consists of the legal fees charged by the
attorney or claims agent (the number of hours worked times the hourly rate)











2001 E 128.65 E 128.00 17
2002 E 140.75 9.40 % E 137.50 7.42 % 38
2003 E 144.07 2.36 % E 138.88 1.00 % 66
2004 E 153.67 6.66 % E 150.00 8.01 % 85
2005 E 162.39 5.67 % E 160.00 6.67 % 104
2006 E 169.37 4.30 % E 168.50 5.31 % 124













































and overhead costs, including VAT. In order to calculate this relationship, we
set up a new database consisting of those personal injury files for which both
the start and end date is provided. In addition, we only selected those files
which provide the total amounts of extrajudicial costs and where the amount
of damages paid to the victim is known. This left a selection of 746 cases. For
each of these files, the relationship between the total extrajudicial costs and the
damages paid to the victim was calculated. Next, on this basis, the average and
the median were determined. Table 8 provides the results for the entire da-
tabase as well as separately for attorneys and for claims agents. The Table also
provides information on the average duration of a case.
Table 8 clearly suggests that the ratio of extrajudicial costs to damages is (on
average) substantially higher for claims agents than for attorneys. Table 9
shows how this relationship between extrajudicial costs and damages has
evolved in recent years. We selected the files on the basis of the year in which
they started.
The Table shows that the median of the extrajudicial costs/damages ratio has
substantially increased over the years. The average also seems to have inc-
reased, but more gradually. This can easily be explained by the fact that there
were some cases where the extrajudicial costs/damages ratio was extremely
high, which quickly influences the average. These extreme cases exercise less
influence on the median. In this case, a trend analysis of the median provides
more reliable information than the average. One important nuance has to be
stated concerning the data provided: it seems that the average duration of a
personal injury file shows a decreasing trend. That is, however, not the result
of the fact that cases on average take a shorter time (we do not have sufficient
Table 8 Ratio of extrajudicial costs/damages (all cases)
Average Median Duration in months
(average)
Number of observations
Total 51.80 % 38.80 % 21.97 746
Attorneys 47.70 % 35.84 % 23.50 336
Claims agents 55.15 % 40.77 % 20.71 410
Table 9 Ratio of extrajudicial costs/damages (development 2001–2006: all cases)
Year Average Median Duration in months (average) Number of observations
2001 46.01 % 29.76 % 33.89 87
2002 52.76 % 38.79 % 30.30 123
2003 53.84 % 39.22 % 25.72 155
2004 51.89 % 41.39 % 18.85 169
2005 52.96 % 40.95 % 14.08 142
2006 50.19 % 43.32 % 7.72 70













































data to assess that). It is exclusively the result of the fact that in this database we
only included files which were closed. Cases which continued to run after 2006
were not included in this database.
We expected that the ratio of extrajudicial costs and damages would to some
extent depend upon the amount of the damages. It was anticipated that the
extrajudicial costs/damages ratio would be substantially higher in the case of
accidents with low damages than in the case of high damages. Therefore, we
made a subdivision into the following four groups:
1. damages lower than or equal to E 5,000
2. damages greater than E 5,000 but lower than or equal to E 10,000
3. damages greater than E 10,000 but lower than or equal to E 25,000
4. damages greater than E 25,000.
This Table clearly shows that the extrajudicial costs/damages ratio decreases in
the case of higher damages. The Table also shows that the extrajudicial costs/
damages ratio in the case of low damages is higher for legal representatives than
for attorneys, whereas the result is exactly opposite in the case of high da-
mages.
Table 10 Ratio of extrajudicial costs/damages (size of damages)
Average Median Duration in months
(average)
Number of observations
1. Damages  E 5,000
Total 86.24 % 70.09 % 15.38 287
Attorneys 84.84 % 71.02 % 16.84 107
Claims agents 87.07 % 69.41 % 14.51 180
2. Damages > E 5,000 and  E 10,000
Total 45.55 % 41.74 % 22.38 150
Attorneys 46.86 % 44.18 % 22.93 65
Claims agents 44.55 % 41.02 % 21.97 85
3. Damages > E 10,000 and  E 25,000
Total 27.75 % 24.89 % 24.68 159
Attorneys 28.64 % 25.71 % 24.83 83
Claims agents 26.77 % 24.63 % 24.53 76
4. Damages > E 25,000
Total 17.64 % 15.45 % 31.28 150
Attorneys 18.85 % 16.55 % 31.43 81
Claims agents 16.22 % 15.26 % 31.12 69













































IV. Tariff development of other comparable services
We attempted to compare the development of legal fees charged as extraju-
dicial costs with the development of other prices/fees charged in the same
period. Unfortunately, the data available in the Netherlands in that respect are
scarce. We attempted, for example, to provide an indication of the develop-
ment of hourly rates generally charged by attorneys in the same period, but did
not obtain accurate information. There is some general statistical information
available concerning the evolution of lawyers’ fees in the Netherlands which
we will discuss below (in Section IV.D). However, these data are not very
precise and therefore not very reliable. We obtained accurate information on
the development of the consumer price index (Section IV.A), the development
of wages on the basis of collective labour agreements (Section IV.B) and the
development of the hourly rates charged by trustees in bankruptcy in the same
period (Section IV.C).
A. Development of consumer price index 2001 –2006
Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek – CBS) keeps in-
formation on inflation which is generally based on the consumer price index
(CPI) for families. Although Statistics Netherlands takes 2000 as the starting
point (100), re-calculations with 2001 as the base year provide the following
information concerning the development of the consumer price index:








B. Development of wages
Statistics Netherlands also publishes results on the development of wages paid
as a result of collective labour agreements in the Netherlands. Taking again the
year 2001 as a starting point (100), we found that such wages developed as
follows:





















































C. Fees charged by trustees in bankruptcy
The legal fees for a trustee in bankruptcy are fixed after negotiations with the
Netherlands Order of Attorneys by a directive determined by judges dealing
with bankruptcy cases. There is a so-called basic hourly fee which can be
adjusted, taking into account inter alia the number of years of experience of the
trustee in bankruptcy involved.
For the purposes of our research, it is interesting to mention how the hourly
rate has developed over the years. The data from this Table will subsequently
be compared with the development of the hourly rates for personal injury
lawyers.
Table 13 Legal fees for trustees in bankruptcy
Year Hourly rate
1 January 1999 E 137.95 (f 304)28
1 January 2000 E 148.39 (f 327)
1 January 2001 E 152.47 (f 336)
1 January 2002 E 158
1 January 2003 E 16529
1 January 2004 E 17030
1 January 2005 E 17131
1 January 2006 E 17232
1 January 2007 E 17633
28 The ‘f’ stands for guilders, the currency used in the Netherlands before the introduction
of the Euro. The amounts have been converted to Euros.
29 The figures for 1999 – 2003 are based on EH de Jonge-Wiemans et al (eds), Advoca-
tenmemo 2003 (2003) 76.
30 Art 24 of the Directive concerning Legal Fees for Trustees in Bankruptcy, July 2004
version.
31 Based on <http://rechtennieuws.nl>, accessed on 13 June 2007.
32 Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht (2006) 66.
33 Based on <http://tijdregistratie.voor-curatoren.nl>, accessed on 13 June 2007. The
Advocatenmemo 2007 mentions the same amount.













































D. General evolution in lawyers’ fees
Since 2002 Statistics Netherlands has published information on the evolution
of prices paid for particular services. A difference is made between standard
hourly fees and hourly fees which have actually been charged. The latter are
based on annual data from law firms that advise their clients in civil and
criminal matters. Statistics Netherlands publishes yearly and quarterly figures
but they do not run parallel since they have a different base year and, more-
over, the sample includes different law firms and the quarterly data do not
contain the standard hourly rate. Statistics Netherlands itself maintains that
the numbers only have a tentative character.34 The figures published are as
follows:
Table 14 Lawyers’ hourly rates (annual data)35
Lawyers; annual price index (2002=100)
Price index actually charged hourly
fees
Price index standard hourly fees
Hourly fee per year Difference Hourly fee per year Difference
Year 2002=100 % 2002=100 %
2002 100 . 100 .
2003 105 5 105 5
2004* 106 1 110 5
2005* 113 3
Table 15 Lawyers’ hourly rates (quarterly data)36
Lawyers; price index actually charged hourly fees (4th quarter 2003=100)
Price index Difference (quarter) Difference (year)
Period 4th quarter 2003=100 %
2004 4th quarter 102 -1 2
2004 103 . .
2005 1st quarter 103 0 0
2005 2nd quarter 105 2 1
2005 3rd quarter 105 0 2
2005 4th quarter 107 2 4
2005 105 . 2
2006 1st quarter 109 2 6
2006 2nd quarter 110 1 5
2006 3rd quarter 110 0 5
2006 4th quarter 111 1 4
2006 110 . 5
34 See the document ‘prijsindex advocatuur’ at <http://www.cbs.nl>.
35 Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen, 13 June 2007.
36 Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen, 13 June 2007.













































These data are in other words not very useful since they do not cover the same
period as our research (2001 –2006). Additionally, the absolute numbers
(hourly fees) are not given. Moreover, the yearly fees do not match well with
the quarterly figures. Even though these Tables seem to indicate that there has
generally been an increase in lawyers’ fees, the data are not reliable enough to
draw any firm conclusions. Hence, we will not take these numbers into ac-
count in our subsequent analysis.
V. Comparison and analysis
A. General remarks
It is clear from the data presented that one has to be extremely cautious in
drawing conclusions. We did have representative data which provide statisti-
cally relevant information on the evolution of extrajudicial costs paid by liability
insurers to attorneys and claims agents in the period 2001–2006. This at least
makes it possible to provide ‘hard’ evidence of the evolution of those fees in the
period we examined. It is, however, much more difficult to examine whether the
relevant increase in the fees is connected to the fact that they have been shifted to
the tortfeasor’s insurer. To examine this, we would also need data on fees
charged by personal injury lawyers in cases where such fee shifting does not
exist. In fact, interviewees declared that fees charged by them (at least by at-
torneys) are no different when they can be recovered as extrajudicial costs from a
liability insurer than when this is not the case. Also, although we can show a
relatively high increase in extrajudicial costs in the examined period compared
to, for example, the consumer price index or the fees of a trustee in bankruptcy,
this does not necessarily prove that it has been caused by the fact that personal
injury lawyers can shift their fees as extrajudicial costs to the liability insurer.
The data are thus primarily interesting to describe specific evolutions; the
search for causes of these developments (in legal fees) is more speculative and
therefore should be interpreted with caution at a normative level.
B. Development of extrajudicial costs
Table 3 provided an overview of the evolution of extrajudicial costs paid in the
period 2001–2006 by liability insurers to personal injury lawyers. Generally, it
showed an increase between 2001 and 2006 of 24.44 %, a result which was sta-
tistically robust. It is striking that the largest increase could be found in 2002 (with
6.57 %). Since the Euro was introduced on 1 January 2002, this seems to provide
support to those who claimed that the introduction of the Euro would have an
inflationary effect.













































We also made a distinction as far as the development of hourly rates of attorneys
and claims agents is concerned. A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 shows that the
average hourly rate charged by attorneys is approximately E 20 higher than the
fees charged by claims agents.37 However, a comparison of Tables 4 and 5 also
shows that the relative increase in the hourly rate was greater with claims agents
than with attorneys. Whereas the increase in the hourly rate between 2001 and
2006 was 21.76 % for attorneys (Table 4), Table 5 shows that, in the same period,
the increase in the hourly rate for claims agents was 28.77 %.
A similar result also follows when addressing the median hourly rates, which
can be seen in Table 6. For attorneys, the median hourly rate increased from
E 158.82 in 2001 to E 195 in 2006, an increase of almost 23 %. In the case of
claims agents, the median hourly rate was E 140 in 2001 and increased to E 175
in 2006, exactly 25 %. We also showed, by excluding the ten largest firms from
the database of claims agents (in Table 7), that average hourly rates are sub-
stantially higher for the entire database of claims agents when the ten largest
firms are excluded, thus showing that the largest firms charge relatively higher
hourly rates. There is, however, a ‘catching up’ in the sense that over the years
these differences become smaller.
C. Comparison to the evolution of other prices and services
More interesting than the mere analysis of the evolution of the extrajudicial
costs is the question whether these costs have risen not only in absolute terms,
but also relative to the evolution of other prices and services. We gave details
(in Table 11) of inflation in the same period based on the consumer price index
and established that consumer prices had increased between 2001 and 2006 by
9.79 %. Wages paid on the basis of collective labour agreements increased by
10.82 % in the same period (see Table 12). The simple conclusion is therefore
that legal fees paid as extrajudicial costs have increased substantially more than
both consumer prices and wages: in fact, more than twice as much (24.44 %).
In addition, Table 13 provided an overview of the evolution of fees charged
by other legal professionals, specifically, trustees in bankruptcy. In the same
period the trustee’s (basic) fee increased from E 152.47 to E 172: an increase
of 12.81 %. The simple conclusion is therefore that legal fees paid as extra-
judicial costs to personal injury lawyers by liability insurers increased by
(almost) twice as much. The fees paid to trustees in bankruptcy hence inc-
reased more than the consumer price index and wages, but substantially less
than legal fees paid as extrajudicial costs. This can also be shown in the
following graphs:
37 For example in 2006 the hourly rate of a claims agent was E 178.88 whereas the hourly
rate for an attorney was E 194.95.













































Graph 1 Comparative evolution of tariffs 1 (2001=100)
Here, the curves represent, respectively (from top to bottom): fees paid to personal
injury lawyers, fees paid to trustees, wage inflation, and price inflation.
Graph 2 Comparative evolution of tariffs 2 (2001=100)
In this graph the curves represent the following (from top to bottom): fees paid to
attorneys, fees paid to claims agents, fees paid to trustees, wage inflation, and price
inflation.
D. The relationship between legal fees and damages
Further research addressed the relationship between the total amount of ex-
trajudicial costs paid by liability insurers and the amount of the damages













































received by the victim. Table 8 showed that, when all cases in the period 2001 –
2006 are taken together, the average ratio of costs to damages, expressed in
percentage terms, was 51.80 % and the median was 38.80 %. The amount of
extrajudicial costs as a proportion of total damages appeared to be higher for
claims agents (55.15 %) than for attorneys (47.70 %). It appeared moreover
that, especially in cases with low damages, claims agents are relatively ex-
pensive. The word ‘relative’ in this particular context refers to the fact that, in
small value cases, the amount of extrajudicial costs seems to be higher for
claims agents than for attorneys (even though the differences are small). The
reverse is true for cases where the damages are high: in these cases, attorneys
are relatively expensive – at least, the extrajudicial costs/damages ratio is
higher than it is for claims agents. Again, the differences are not very large.
We calculated the results for four different groups of damages awards arranged
by size (Table 10). When the total amount of damages was higher than E 25,000
it appeared that the average percentage of extrajudicial costs was 17.64 %
(with a median of 15.45 %) whereas in cases where the damages were lower
than or equal to E 5,000, the extrajudicial costs were 86.24 % (with a median of
70.09 %). Not surprisingly, when lower awards are made, the extrajudicial
costs/damages ratio is high.
Looking at a trend for the years 2001 –2006 one can notice a slight increase in
the ratio of extrajudicial costs to damages. However, one has to be careful
when interpreting these data since the average duration of each case decreased
over the period surveyed whereas the number of cases involving small amounts
of damages increased. This is of course due to the fact that the database only
contains information relating to six years and files that were open at the end of
this period were excluded.
E. Comparison of the absolute amounts
The numbers presented so far have shown that extrajudicial costs increased
relatively rapidly, especially when compared to the evolution of other prices.
It is, however, far more difficult to judge whether legal fees charged as ex-
trajudicial costs are high compared to other services. Analysing the informa-
tion presented on various personal injury lawyers’ websites, the fees charged
to private clients (who were in some cases injurers and their liability insurers)
seem to be no different from the tariffs charged as extrajudicial costs. One
could additionally ask the question whether the relative price charged by
personal injury lawyers is expensive compared to other services. Table 3
showed that in 2006 the average hourly rate of a personal injury lawyer was
E 185.90 (E 194.95 for an attorney and E 178.88 for a claims agent). This is
slightly higher than the hourly rate charged by a trustee in bankruptcy (E 172













































in 2006), but then again, the services performed by personal injury lawyers
may require a type of expertise which could justify this (small) difference.
Finally, one could also examine the hourly rates charged by other experts who
are involved in the settlement of personal injury claims. Some data are available
(but unfortunately not the evolution of rates over time) for example, for me-
dical advisers. The hourly rates charged by members of the Association of
Attorneys of Personal Injuty Victims (Vereniging van Advocaten voor
Slachtoffers van Personenschade – ASP) for experts was (in 2007) on average
E 175. Insurers state that the hourly rate paid to a medical adviser or labour
expert was approximately E 130.38 Even though hard data on these issues are
lacking, it seems that hourly rates charged for experts other than personal
injury lawyers are systematically lower.39 One has to stress, however, that the
fact that personal injury lawyers seem systematically to charge higher hourly
rates than other experts can hardly be due to the fact that their legal fees can be
charged to the liability insurer as extrajudicial costs. Indeed, the costs of other
experts involved in the claims settlement (like medical experts and labour
experts) can also under certain circumstances be shifted to the liable party’s
insurer.
F. Evaluation
As we indicated in Section II, fee shifting leads to a situation whereby the price
charged for legal services is to a large extent not subject to competition. The
reason is that, in most cases (where liability is not disputed and the case does
not go to court), the insurer of the liable party will pay the legal fees of the
victim’s lawyer. Our data showed that only in 119 of the 1,043 cases was
liability disputed; in 905 files this was not the case. Moreover, even in those
cases where liability was disputed, in a majority of them there was no trial. As a
result of this fee shifting, the lawyer has very little incentive to advertise with
low fees in order to attract clients. First of all, it may even have a negative
marketing effect since it could signal low quality. And second, it appears that
lawyers are advertising the fact that in most cases their fees can be shifted to the
insurer of the liable party, as a result of which the price should not be a decisive
element for the victim.
Only in those cases where victims would be highly risk averse and they take
into account the small likelihood that part of the legal fees would be charged to
them (in the event that they lose at trial) could the fee be a decisive issue. In that
case, a risk-averse victim may have incentives to opt for legal assistance
38 These estimates are based on questionnaires we sent to the participating insurers.
39 This becomes clear also when looking at the websites of various law firms specialised in
personal injury cases who advertise the fees charged both for the personal injury lawyer
dealing with the case and for other experts involved in the settlement of the claim.













































through a claims agent for the reason that claims agents are allowed to use ‘no
win no fee’ arrangements (thus substantially reducing the risk for the victim)
whereas attorneys (ie members of the Bar) are not.
The crucial question in our study is of course whether the relatively sharp
increase in legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs can be attributed to the very
fact that these costs are shifted to the insurer of the liable party. A related
question is whether there may be explanations for this increase other than fee
shifting.
We will attempt to answer these questions in Table 16 below by providing on
the left side ‘no’ arguments, holding that there is no relationship between the
increase in extrajudicial costs on the one hand and fee shifting on the other; on
the right side, we give the ‘yes’ arguments, holding the opposite, namely that
there is such a relationship.
Table 16 Relationship between fee shifting and increase of extrajudicial costs
No Yes
Increase only observed in 2001–2006; fee
shifting possibility already introduced in a
decision of 1987, confirmed in the Civil Code
in 1992.
Data from before 2001 are lacking. Perhaps
increase already started earlier than 2001. It is
very likely that the market of personal injury
lawyers only realised the commercial conse-
quences of the fee shifting rule in the second
half of the 1990s.
Lawyers do not charge more to insurers as
extrajudicial costs than they do to other clients.
Hourly fees are the same for everyone.
For many lawyers who specialise in personal
injury cases (especially those only representing
victims) extrajudicial costs are their main
business, given that 95 % of cases are settled.
Hence, hourly fees charged as extrajudicial
costs can set the price for other legal fees as
well.
Statistics Netherlands data seem to indicate
that lawyers’ fees generally have increased in
the Netherlands in the same period.
These data are, as indicated above, unreliable
since the yearly data and the quarterly data do
not match.
Services of personal injury lawyers have be-
come more complicated over the years; hence,
the increase in the hourly fee.
There is no indication that services did become
more complicated. If more complicated, it
would justify more hours, but would not
explain why hourly fees have increased.
A higher fee results from lawyers providing a
better service and being able to work fewer
hours.
Data concerning the relationship between ex-
trajudicial costs and damages show that also
total extrajudicial costs (as a percentage of
damages) increased slightly.
No statistically relevant relationship proven
between fee shifting and price increase.
No reason other than fee shifting can explain
why, in the period 2001–2006, legal fees
charged as extrajudicial costs increased 2.5
times more than inflation and 2 times more
than fees of trustees in bankruptcy.













































This Table shows that many arguments could be advanced to hold that it is not
because of fee shifting that legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs increased so
dramatically in the period 2001 –2006.40 However, a main weakness of all of
these arguments is that no other convincing argument can be presented that
could explain the drastic increase we have observed. Even though we realise
that we cannot formulate hard conclusions based on our statistical evidence,41
we are tempted to believe that, in the absence of other explanations, it is the
ability of personal injury lawyers to charge their legal fees as extrajudicial costs
to the liability insurer of the tortfeasor which provides the major explanation
for the increase we observed.
Finally, we should mention that there may be other social consequences re-
lated to fee shifting. First of all, our data indicated (see more particularly
Tables 9 and 10) that legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs constitute a
relatively large percentage of the damages paid by liability insurers. A cons-
equence is that where on average 50 % of payments made by liability insurers
goes to personal injury lawyers in the form of extrajudicial costs, this un-
avoidably also has consequences for premiums charged and hence for the
social costs of particular activities. A well-known economic consequence is
that an excessively low activity level may be the result since socially desirable
activities become too costly.
A related issue is that, as a result of fee shifting, discussions between personal
injury lawyers and liability insurers often concern the issue of extrajudicial
costs. Interviewees (insurers and personal injury lawyers) provided us with
examples of cases where parties acted strategically.42 As a result of this, parties
have discussions about the amount of legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs
instead of focusing on the real issue at stake, namely the claim settlement. The
mere fact that it is the insurer of the liable party who has to pay the fees of the
victim’s lawyer may understandably create the setting for perverse incentives
and strategic behaviour. Many interviewees therefore held that the fee shifting
rule in the Netherlands has a negative influence on the effectiveness of the
claim settlement process itself. Even though payment of the personal injury
lawyer’s fees as extrajudicial costs and the settlement of the victim’s claim are
40 And of course the ‘no’ arguments listed in Table 14 were advanced to us both during
interviews we held with personal injury lawyers and in press releases after the publi-
cation in the Netherlands of our research results.
41 For the simple reason that we have no observations of a ‘control group’ which would
consist of a study of the evolution of legal fees for personal injury cases where such fee
shifting is not possible.
42 For example personal injury lawyers maintaining that they are only willing to convince
their client to accept a settlement if the insurer formally agrees to pay the legal fees
charged by the lawyer as extrajudicial costs, or insurers arguing that they will only pay
the personal injury lawyer’s invoice if he can convince his client to accept the offer made
by the insurer.













































two different issues which should in theory be separated, in practice this is not
always the case.
VI. Concluding remarks
We focused on a remarkable rule of tort law in the Netherlands according to
which the extrajudicial costs incurred by victims (in practice legal fees paid to
the personal injury lawyer before trial) can be charged to the liability insurer of
the tortfeasor. This rule came into being as a result of a decision of the Hoge
Raad in 1987 and was later incorporated into the Civil Code. The main reason
behind this rule is of course the wish to provide further protection to victims of
accidents: if victims have to incur substantial extrajudicial costs to obtain
damages, a large part of these costs would be lost as legal fees and little com-
pensation would remain for the victim.
The goal of our paper was not so much to address the efficiency of this fee
shifting rule as it has been introduced in the Netherlands as to examine em-
pirically some of its effects based on data with more than 1,000 observations
for the period 2001 –2006.
We started from the theoretical prediction that fee shifting as described will
lead to higher prices for the simple reason that the so-called ‘double reason-ACHTUNGTRENNUNGableness test’ to which fee shifting is subjected cannot replace normal com-
petitive forces which would drive down legal fees to efficient levels.
The data show that legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs in the period 2001 –
2006 were indeed high when compared to inflation (2.5 times higher) and also
when compared to other legal services such as those provided by a trustee in
bankruptcy (2 times higher). Even though other explanations for this increase
have been advanced, we tend to believe (we cannot make this belief statistically
robust) that this increase is due to fee shifting. The most important reason for
this belief is that there are no other adequate reasons which would explain the
relatively sizeable increase in legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs. How-
ever, even though an implication of the research may be that legal fees charged
as extrajudicial costs are probably inefficiently high, our study does not allow
such a conclusion for the simple reason that data to compare actual fees
charged with efficient fees were not available.
The data also showed interesting differences between fees charged by claims
agents (legal representatives who are not attorneys) and attorneys (members of
the Bar). Although claims agents are still cheaper (but the difference is small)
the relative increase of legal fees charged as extrajudicial costs has been much
greater for claims agents than for attorneys. Also the percentage of extraju-
dicial costs to total damages is higher for claims agents than for attorneys.













































Although we did not submit fee shifting to a full economic analysis (also
including game theory), we indicated that this fee shifting may have a few
potentially adverse effects. First, the increase showed by our data analysis
leads to the conclusion that social costs of claim settlement may become too
high. Second, this is supported by the fact that a relatively high percentage of
the money paid by liability insurers consists of extrajudicial costs (on average
in the examined period approximately 50 %). And third, fee shifting may
create perverse incentives for lawyers (and liability insurers) to behave stra-
tegically to the detriment of the quality and effectiveness of the claim settle-
ment procedure.
A quick glance at the Netherlands’ two neighbouring countries makes clear
that the Dutch system is exceptional. In Germany, where fee shifting (of
judicial costs) to a losing party is possible under rigorous conditions, strict
regulation of attorneys’ fees exists. In Belgium, as a result of a change in case
law (allowing the recovery of lawyers’ fees from the losing party) a legislative
intervention followed, providing strict regulation of the legal fees which can be
recovered as a result of fee shifting. The argument was that fee shifting should
only be possible if legal fees were regulated.
These arguments may also play a role in the Netherlands at the policy level: the
data show that if (for distributional or other reasons) the policymaker wishes
to shift extrajudicial costs of victims to the tortfeasor (and his insurer), there
may be increased social costs resulting from this fee shifting and a lack of
competitive pressure. If the policymaker still wishes to keep fee shifting (for
victim-protection reasons) but desires to limit some of the potentially adverse
effects we indicated (price increases and strategic behaviour in claim settle-
ment), this may call for some kind of regulation. This could either take the
form of an agreement (a so-called covenant) between personal injury lawyers
and liability insurers, provided that this complies with the requirements of
competition law, or a regulatory intervention (as in Belgium and Germany).
Finally, our research also showed that there are undoubtedly other issues
related to legal fees and claim settlement procedures that merit further re-ACHTUNGTRENNUNGsearch. First of all, decision making by victims concerning the choice of a
particular personal injury lawyer could be subject to further economic (also
game-theoretical) analysis. Particular attention could in that respect be paid to
the effects of fee shifting on the victim’s choices, but also to the question
whether result-based payments are possible. The role played by legal expenses
insurance in claim settlement (which we excluded from our analysis) could
also be the subject of further research.
In general, our research showed that (as economic analysis often indicates)
particular legal interventions may have undesired (sometimes referred to as
‘adverse’ or even ‘perverse’) effects. In this particular case, the shifting of legal
fees charged as extrajudicial costs was introduced in the interest of victims. It













































may, however, have led to substantial increases in legal fees and to strategic
behaviour in the claim settlement process. The consequences may not only be
an increase in social costs; at the distributional level one can also question the
effectiveness of fee shifting. The primary winners of the arrangement seem to
be personal injury lawyers who can charge higher fees, the effects of which will
be felt by the entire community of policyholders paying higher premiums.
Victims seem at first sight to be better off, but a large part of the damages paid
by the insurer goes to their lawyers who may, moreover, have perverse in-
centives to accept a settlement too easily (in order to be able to claim the fees).
Whether victims are ultimately better off with the current system or with a
contingent fee system (which is still largely prohibited in the Netherlands for
attorneys) is highly doubtful. These and related issues merit further research.
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